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Abstract 
 
 
Deflationary nominalism is a novel view in the philosophy of mathematics on which there are 
mathematical statements, such as ‘There are prime numbers’ that are literally true despite the 
nonexistence of any mathematical objects. In this paper, I outline the deflationary nominalism of 
Azzouni, the most prominent contemporary defender of deflationary nominalism. I then object that it is 
committed to some form of Meinongianism. Because I believe that any view’s commitment to 
Meinongianism constitutes a strong reason in favor of rejecting that view, I suggest that deflationary 
nominalism should be rejected. Finally, I conclude that realism about mathematical objects must be 
accepted if we are to understand true mathematical statements as being literally true. 
 
 
 
 
0. Introduction 
 
Where I understand a statement to be literally true if it is true without any need to 
appeal to a paraphrase of that statement, deflationary nominalism is the position that 
there are mathematical statements—such as ‘There are prime numbers’—that are 
literally true, that truth is deflationary, and that mathematical objects do not exist. This 
view straightforwardly implies the paradoxical result that ‘There are prime numbers’ is 
literally true, but that prime numbers do not exist. Yet, the official stance of 
deflationary nominalists is that there are not, in any ontologically serious way, 
nonexistent objects. After outlining what deflationary nominalism is in further depth, I 
will object that it is committed to some form of Meinongianism. I then conclude that 
realism about mathematical objects must be accepted if we are to understand true 
mathematical statements as being literally true. 
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1. What is Deflationary Nominalism? 
 
Azzouni, a prominent deflationary nominalist, states that, “the deflationary nominalist 
rejects Quine’s criterion [of ontological commitment] and correspondence truth. The 
deflationary nominalist, thus, uses Platonic language freely; reference to and 
quantification over Platonic objects don’t commit her to existence of them.”1  I will 
examine what deflationary nominalism is in a piecemeal manner. 
 
1.1 Ontological Commitment 
 
By denying that ‘there is’ is ontologically committing, deflationary nominalists are 
committed to the following: it could be literally true that  
 
┌ There are Fs ┐ and yet nothing with any ontologically serious status is an F. 
For example, ‘There are prime numbers’ is literally true but yet no prime 
numbers exist.  
 
On the Quinean view of ontological commitment, the qualification that there is no 
available paraphrase is important, as we often seem to say true statements like “There is 
a detective named ‘Sherlock Holmes’” despite believing that Sherlock Holmes does not 
really exist; I take it that we believe some paraphrase that does not commit the speaker 
to the existence of Sherlock Holmes is available. And since this paraphrase does not 
commit us to the existence of Sherlock Holmes, someone who said, “There is a 
detective named ‘Sherlock Holmes’” is not committed to the existence of Sherlock 
Holmes on the Quinean criterion of ontological commitment.  
 
By rejecting this criterion of ontological commitment, deflationary nominalists can 
consistently claim that mathematical statements are literally true and yet there is no 
need to be ontologically committed to the being of mathematical objects in any sense at 
all. But why think it is false that “uses of ‘there is’ in the vernacular carry ontological 
commitment”?2  Azzouni claims that the existence of true statements that quantify over 
nonexistent fictional characters entails that the Quinean criterion is mistaken. Consider, 
for example, the following apparently true statement: “Sherlock Holmes is a fictional 
detective.” At least some such statements are, according to Azzouni, literally true—no 
adequate paraphrase is available for some statements that quantify over fictional 
characters.3  
 
                                                          
1 Jody Azzouni. "Why Deflationary Nominalists Shouldn’t Be Agnostics." Philosophical Studies, 
(2014): 1148. 
2 Jody Azzouni. Deflating Existential Consequence: A Case for Nominalism. New York: Oxford 
University Press, (2004): 62. 
3 Azzouni, “Deflating Existential Consequence,” 67-71. 
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I may accept Azzouni’s assumption that fictional objects do not exist, but I believe that 
there are adequate paraphrases for all apparently true statements that quantify over 
fictional characters. I, however, will not discuss this concern further in this paper. 
 
Azzouni, realizing that one is bound to wonder what the correct criterion of ontological 
commitment is if Quine’s is rejected, contends that we should accept mind and 
language independence as the criterion; this proposal amounts to holding that only 
things that we believe are psychologically and linguistically independent of us exist.4  
But fictional characters and mathematical objects, according to Azzouni, are 
ontologically dependent on our linguistic practices and so do not exist.5   
 
According to Azzouni, mathematical objects are dependent on us because  
 
in pure mathematics…sheer postulation reigns: A mathematical subject with its 
accompanying posits can be created ex nihilo by simply writing down a set of 
axioms…[Furthermore,] sheer postulation (in practice) is restricted by one other 
factor: Mathematicians must find the resulting mathematics “interesting.” But 
nothing else seems required of posits as they arise in pure mathematics; they’re 
not even required to pay their way via applications to already established 
mathematical theories or to one or another branch of empirical science.6  
 
These claims are certainly striking. According to Azzouni, mathematics is, in an 
important sense, made up by our linguistic practices like fiction is. He concludes that 
no mathematical objects exist. Discourse about mathematical objects becomes akin to 
talk about fictional entities; it turns out that “we can (and do) say true (and false) things 
about nonexistent beings of [both] sorts.”7  I myself am of the opinion that it is absurd 
for mathematical objects to be in any way ontologically dependent on human activity, 
but I shall not develop this concern further in this paper. 
 
1.2 Deflationary Truth 
 
A deflationary theory of truth is one that claims that the instances of either of the 
following two equivalence schemas yield everything there is to know about truth: 
 
(ES-sent) The statement ‘s’ is true iff s. 
(ES-prop) The proposition that p is true iff p. 
 
                                                          
4 Azzouni. "Why Deflationary Nominalists Shouldn’t Be Agnostics,” 1149. 
5 Azzouni, “Deflating Existential Consequence,” 112. 
6 Azzouni, “Deflating Existential Consequence,” 127-128, his emphasis. 
7 Jody Azzouni. "Mathematical Fictions." In Fiction and Art, edited by Ananta Sukla, 63-78. 
Bloomsbury Publishing, (2015): 65. 
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Different deflationary theorists will also give different answers to the question as to 
whether the truth of the instances of the equivalence schema of choice—either (ES-
sent) or (ES-prop)—are necessary or merely material equivalences.8  I propose that the 
instances are necessary equivalences, as this position seems more plausible to me. 
 
A deflationary notion of truth seems to cohere well with the claim that there are literally 
true statements such that the objects these statements quantify over do not exist. To see 
why, let us see how things stand for the deflationary nominalist if a correspondence 
theory of truth is correct. 
 
Under the correspondence theory of truth, a truthbearer (statement or proposition) is 
true if it corresponds in some appropriate way to reality. A truthbearer T corresponds to 
reality just in case T accurately describes the way reality really is. So, the proposition 
that snow is white corresponds to reality but the proposition that the snow is fuchsia 
does not. I think we can assume, without loss of generalization, that correspondence is 
some relation between a truthbearer and a fact, where facts are somehow constituted of 
objects and properties; for example, the fact that snow is white is somehow constituted 
of snow and the property of whiteness.9  
 
We are now in a position to see why, given her stance on mathematical truth and 
mathematical objects, it would be unwise for a deflationary nominalist to accept a 
correspondence theory of truth. Since we create a mathematical subject by merely 
positing some axioms, all mathematical doctrine, applied or unapplied, can be seen as 
true. This is the case even if mathematical systems are considered that 
contain…incompatible (e.g. the axiom of choice vs. the axiom of determinacy), simply 
because such systems can be isolated from one another by segregating them within 
different languages or at least using different terminology (e.g. “set” and “set*,” where 
sets obey the axiom of choice and sets* obey the axiom of determinacy.)10   
 
One problem that a correspondence theory of truth poses is that it seems that true 
mathematical statements must correspond to facts containing mathematical objects, 
which implies that mathematical objects exist. The deflationary nominalist might be 
able to get out this problem by insisting that the facts corresponding to true 
mathematical statements instead contain the linguistic acts involved in positing the 
relevant set of axioms; such facts do not contain mathematical objects.  
 
                                                          
8 Stoljar, Daniel. "The Deflationary Theory of Truth." Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
August 28, 1997. Accessed November 25, 2015. 
9 Marian David. "The Correspondence Theory of Truth." Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
May 10, 2002. Accessed November 25, 2015. 
10 Azzouni, “Deflating Existential Consequence,” 48, his emphasis. 
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But it is unclear that the linguistic acts involved in positing the axioms of incompatible 
systems, in fact, use different languages or terminology; were we really talking about 
entirely different objects—sets and sets*—when positing the axioms of ZFC and ZFD 
(ZF plus the axiom of determinacy)? I do not find it plausible to think that, in actual 
practice, mathematicians distinguish between sets and sets*. In other words, I do not 
find it credible that the actual linguistic acts involved in positing axioms of 
incompatible systems used different languages or terminology. If such linguistic acts 
did not use different languages or terminology, then it would—for the deflationary 
nominalist—be both the case that the axioms of ZFC and ZFD are true; but this result 
implies a contradiction, since the axiom of choice and the axiom of determinacy are 
inconsistent. For the deflationary nominalist, incompatible systems must be separated 
from one another using different languages or terminology; deflationary theories of 
truth do not “prevent[ ] such a construal of mathematical doctrine.”11  So it seems that, 
as the name of their position seems to suggest, deflationary nominalists are committed 
to some deflationary theory of truth. 
 
In any case, even if, perhaps by appealing to some form semantic externalism, the 
deflationary nominalist can motivate the claim that mathematicians mean something 
different by the word ‘set’ when working with ZFC than when working with ZFD, I 
will be content to observe that deflationary nominalism and deflationary theories of 
truth are natural allies. 
 
1.3 Literal Truth 
 
A purportedly distinctive advantage of deflationary nominalism, in comparison to other 
nominalist positions, is its taking true mathematical statements to be literally true.12  
The statements ‘2+2=4’, ‘There are infinitely many prime numbers’, and ‘ZFC does not 
entail the Continuum Hypothesis or its negation’ are literally true. It may seem that 
some mathematical objects, such as the number 2 or the theory ZFC, must exist for 
these statements to be true. Recall, however, that according to Azzouni, these 
statements are not committed to the existence of any mathematical objects. 
 
2. Meinongianism and Deflationary Nominalism 
 
I shall now proceed to develop my objection to this new and interesting position. My 
main objection is that deflationary nominalism is committed to Meinongianism; 
Meinongianism is the position that there really are objects—of serious ontological 
status—that do not exist. I will say that an object “subsists” if it has being but does not 
exist. Hence, Meinongianism is the view that the set of subsisting objects is nonempty. 
It is hard to not suspect that the deflationary nominalist is a Meinongian of some sort 
                                                          
11 Azzouni, “Deflating Existential Consequence,” 48. 
12 Azzouni, “Deflating Existential Consequence,” 4. 
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when she claims that there are infinitely many prime numbers but no prime numbers 
exist. 
 
Azzouni, however, rejects Meinongianism because he describes, “mathematical terms 
as referring to nothing at all.”13  He denies there are nonexistent objects with any 
serious ontological status; that is, he believes that the set of subsisting objects is empty. 
‘There are prime numbers’ is true despite the nonexistence and “non-subsistence” of 
prime numbers, according to Azzouni, because ‘there is’ is completely ontologically 
neutral. The issue, however, is whether or not the deflationary nominalist, given his 
other commitments, can consistently deny commitment to Meinongianism. I do not 
think that he can. 
 
I think that a dilemma posed by Bueno and Zalta suggests that the deflationary 
nominalism entails Meinongianism.14  Either the numeral ‘2’ refers or it does not. 
Assume ‘2’ does refer. But reference is such that if any expression e refers at all, then e 
refers to something. Then there is some object, the number 2, referred to by the numeral 
‘2’. Now, either 2 exists or it does not. The deflationary nominalist cannot accept that 2 
exists; if 2 exists, then some mathematical object exists and nominalism is false. If 2 
does not exist, then nominalism is saved, at least “in letter.” However, ‘2’ must refer to 
something—namely, 2. Therefore, 2 must have some being. However, 2, we are 
supposing, does not exist. So, 2 subsists. Hence, Meinongianism is true.  
 
Perhaps, however, the deflationary nominalist will deny that ‘2’ refers and instead 
maintain that ‘2’ does not refer to anything—existing or subsisting—at all. If ‘2’ does 
not refer to anything at all, however, then ∃y(y=2) is false.15  This result contradicts the 
deflationary nominalist’s claim to accept mathematical claims that are considered true 
as literally true. “After all, a mathematician could correctly infer that ∃y(y=2) from the 
true premises that ∃!y(1 < y < 3), 1 < 2, and 2 < 3.”16  The deflationary nominalist, if 
she denies that ‘2’ refers at all, seems committed to the absurd result that some 
apparently obviously true mathematical statements are, in fact, false. 
 
Azzouni himself would deny that ‘2’ refers. He claims that, “no mathematical terms 
refer.”17  His suggested way out of the problem of how ‘∃y(y=2)’ could be true if ‘2’ 
did not refer is to deny that “a statement that’s true or false has to be about something 
                                                          
13 Azzouni, “Deflating Existential Consequence,” 4-5. 
14 Otávio Bueno and Edward Zalta. "A Nominalist's Dilemma and Its Solution." Philosophia 
Mathematica, (2005): 297. 
15 If the deflationary nominalist claims that ‘∃y(y=2)’ is true because 2 subsists, then she thereby 
grants that I am right in believing that she is a Meinongian. 
16 Bueno and Zalta, “A Nominalist’s Dilemma,” 299. 
17 Azzouni, “Mathematical Fictions,” 70. 
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that exists.”18  This proposal, however, seems to be nothing more than a restatement of 
a rejection of the Quinean criterion of ontological commitment; this is no explanation 
of how ‘∃y(y=2)’ can be true without having ‘2’ refer to any (existing or subsisting) 
object. 
 
Bueno and Zalta themselves suggest that a deflationary nominalist could accept that ‘2’ 
refers but that 2 has no being whatsoever by accepting a form of their object theory in 
which ordinary, concrete objects “exemplify,” or instantiate, properties and abstract 
objects “encode” (and sometimes exemplify) properties. According to Bueno and 
Zalta’s friendly amendment, “the number 2 (of PNT, say) becomes identified as 
nothing more than a reified pattern of talk (i.e., Azzouni’s posits) within the larger 
context of mathematical practice.”19  Bueno and Zalta suggest that the deflationary 
nominalist can take “mathematical objects [to be] no longer ‘self-subsistent’ and 
‘transcendental’, but rather objectified patterns the existence of which depends on the 
activities of mathematicians.”20  So the idea is that ‘2’ refers to something that is not 
ontologically dubious like the abstract numbers favored by platonists. 
 
Azzouni himself might worry that, on this amendment of Bueno and Zalta’s, numbers 
really will have mathematical properties.21  According to Bueno and Zalta, however, we 
avoid being committed to the claim that 2 really has substantive properties by saying 
that 2 merely encodes mathematical properties such as being even and being greater 
than 1. On the other hand, the only properties that 2 exemplifies are ones that should be 
acceptable to the deflationary nominalist; such properties are exemplified by 2 in virtue 
of its being posits within the larger context of mathematical practice. The properties 
that 2 exemplifies include “not being a number, not being a mathematical object, not 
being concrete...[and] being an artifact of such-and-such linguistic practice.”22   
 
I, however, have three objections to a version of deflationary nominalism that accepts 
Bueno and Zalta’s friendly amendment.  
 
First, it seems that the deflationary nominalist is now forced to accept either the 
existence or subsistence of mathematical objects. ‘2’ still refers to 2, even if there is a 
sense in which we “made up” the number 2. So, it seems the deflationary nominalist is 
forced to claim, for example, that all of the natural numbers have being of some sort.  
 
Either she accepts that the numbers exist or she does not. If she accepts that they exist, 
she is not a nominalist; even if numbers are not as platonists conceive of them, a 
                                                          
18 Azzouni, “Mathematical Fictions,” 71. 
19 Bueno and Zalta, “A Nominalist’s Dilemma,” 305. 
20 Bueno and Zalta, “A Nominalist’s Dilemma,” 304. 
21 Bueno and Zalta, “A Nominalist’s Dilemma,” 304. 
22 Bueno and Zalta, “A Nominalist’s Dilemma,” 305. 
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number is a number. If she refuses to accept their existence, then I do not see how she 
avoids commitment to the being—the subsistence—of nonexistent objects like 2. After 
all, ‘2’ has to refer to something according to Bueno and Zalta’s friendly amendment. 
So, this path seems to lead the deflationary nominalist into accepting Meinongianism. 
Hence, if she accepts Bueno and Zalta’s friendly amendment, the deflationary 
nominalist either gives up her nominalism or is stuck with Meinongianism. 
 
My second objection concerns the implications of a comprehension principle for 
abstract objects that is part of the object theory that Bueno and Zalta suggest that the 
deflationary nominalist accept. The comprehension principle for abstract objects, where 
any object y is abstract if ┌ A!y ┐ is true and Φ contains no free x’s, is as follows: 
(A)   ∃x(A!x ˄ ∀F(xF⇔Φ)) 
 
“Intuitively, given any expressible condition on properties Φ, (A) asserts that there is an 
abstract object that encodes just the properties satisfying the condition.”23   
 
I have two critical remarks to make on such abstract objects. First, (A) implies that 
there are uncountably many abstract objects; for example, for any real number r, there 
some abstract object that encodes the property of having the mass of exactly r 
kilograms. I suspect that the deflationary nominalist would not be a fan of such a 
profligate ontology of abstract objects. Second, as Bueno himself observes, “if we 
consider the subsisting objects as those that are abstract, and if we take only concrete 
objects as existing, the resulting picture ideologically is not significantly different from 
the one favored by the deflationary nominalist.”24  Accepting Bueno and Zalta’s object 
theory just seems to lead naturally to some form of Meinongianism. 
 
My third objection is perhaps an obvious one: the notion of an object’s encoding 
properties, as opposed to exemplifying or instantiating them, seems mysterious. I just 
do not really know what to make of encoding properties as opposed to exemplifying 
them. So it is unsatisfying that, as Berto observes, “the distinction between 
exemplification and encoding is taken as primitive.”25  Allow me to summarize the 
dialectic of this section. Following Bueno and Zalta, I argue that deflationary 
nominalism faces some serious problem whether or not ‘2’ refers to anything at all. I 
then consider Azzouni’s reasons for denying that ‘2’ refers at all and then remark that 
he has provided no answer to the problem posed by the horn of the dilemma on which 
‘2’ does not refer. I then engage in a lengthy discussion of Bueno and Zalta’s friendly 
amendment, on which ‘2’ does refer, to deflationary nominalism and why I believe that 
                                                          
23 Bueno and Zalta, “A Nominalist’s Dilemma,” 300-01. 
24 Otávio Bueno. "Nominalism in the Philosophy of Mathematics." Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy. September 16, 2013. Accessed November 25, 2015. 
25 Francesco Berto. Existence as a Real Property: the Ontology of Meinongianism. Dordrecht: 
Springer (2012): 129. 
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it is a rather costly amendment to accept. My overall worry is that it seems dubious that 
a deflationary nominalist can consistently deny the existence of mathematical objects 
like numbers without accepting Meinongianism. And I consider a view’s commitment 
to Meinongianism to constitute a strong reason to reject that view. 
 
 3.  Conclusion 
 
I have objected to deflationary nominalism on the grounds that it is committed to 
Meinongianism. One significant upshot of rejecting deflationary nominalism is that 
realism about mathematical objects becomes more appealing. Realists about 
mathematical objects can take mathematical statements to be literally true. As 
deflationary nominalism seems to be what you get when you combine nominalism with 
the thesis that true mathematical statements are literally true, it seems dubious that 
nominalists can take mathematical discourse literally. As a result, it seems that a 
distinctive theoretical advantage of realism over nominalism is its ability to take 
mathematical discourse literally. Some philosophers will consider this to be a small 
advantage and others will consider this to be a substantial advantage. But any 
advantage is still an advantage. 
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